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Abstract. We propose a framework based on Network Formation Game
for self-organization in the Internet of Things (IoT), in which heteroge-
neous and multi-interface nodes are modeled as self-interested agents
who individually decide on establishment and severance of links to other
agents. Through analysis of the static game, we formally confirm the
emergence of realistic topologies from our model, and analytically estab-
lish the criteria that lead to stable multi-hop network structures.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
Through the past decade, the number of internet-enabled devices has been grow-
ing at an unprecedented rate. The paradigm of Internet of Things (IoT) envisions
an even more immersive and pervasive exploitation of internet connectivity by
enabling more objects and devices to connect. Emerging applications of this
move towards ubiquitous connectivity are wide and vast [1], ranging from do-
mestic monitoring and smart home solutions to healthcare solutions [2], smart
grids[3], and disaster monitoring [4]. It hence follows that instances of IoT will
be comprised of a great number of various devices, each with unique require-
ments and capabilities, leading to heterogeneity both in terms of function and
communications.
The inevitably high degree of heterogeneity and scalability of IoT, dim the
odds of feasibility and scalability for centralized control approaches [5]. An al-
ternative to centralized architectures for IoT are those that rely on autonomic
management of connectivity and resources through self-configuration [6]. Such
solutions model the network as a system comprised of individual agents, each of
which aims to retain connectivity with the network while optimizing their objec-
tives, such as energy consumption and throughput. Even though this multi-agent
abstraction presents a promising approach towards scalability, the decentralized
nature of self-configuring IoT gives rise to many critical challenges in mecha-
nism design. Of the most critical of these challenges is the problem of topology
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Fig. 1: Applications of IoT
control, which is further complicated by the heterogeneity of IoT devices. Ow-
ing to the similarity of distributed IoT and Ad Hoc networks, the literature on
self-organization and topological analysis of IoT are mainly focused on adopting
techniques that are originally developed for generic distributed networks such as
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) [6]. Yet, unique features, such as the immense
diversity in capabilities and requirements in all aspects of IoT present major dis-
tinguishing factors that necessitate the development of techniques specific to the
challenges of this emerging technology.
The multi-agent model of IoT is comprised of opportunistic devices that aim
to maximize their success in fulfilling their individual objectives, such as preser-
vation of connectivity to the network, minimization of energy consumption and
maintenance of a minimum Quality of Service (QoS). The inherent limitation of
resources available to such opportunistic agents in any real-world deployment of
IoT gives rise to a competitive environment, which motivates a game theoretic
investigation of interactions in self-organizing IoT. The application of game the-
ory to distributed topology control and self-organization has been an active area
of research in recent years. Some of the notable literature in this area include
the work of Eidenbenz, et. al. [7] on the analysis of equilibria in topology control
games, Nahir, et. al.’s detailed investigation of applying game theory to various
problems of topology control [8], and Saad et. al. proposal’s of a game theo-
retic algorithm for cooperative relaying in [9], based on their earlier analysis of
the formation of hierarchical topologies in multi-hop networks [10]. The models
presented in these and many other topology control games, one critical limita-
tion is the assumption on homogeneity of the network. Recently, Meirom et. al.
proposed a model of topology control games for heterogeneous AS-Level net-
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works [11] [12], which considers some degree of heterogeneity, but only accounts
homogeneous link costs.
Based on the inevitable emphasis on the connectivity aspects of IoT net-
works, this paper builds on the aforementioned models to provide a framework
for analysis and design of distributed topology control mechanisms in IoT. The
proposed framework is based on modeling of self-organization as a Network For-
mation Game [13], in which the actions of players are establishment or severance
of links with other nodes in the IoT. Contrary to previous models, we consider
heterogeneity in both communications and link cost. The proposed model also
accounts for nodes equipped with multiple communication interfaces, thus sup-
porting modern devices such as smart phones. We provide an analytical deriva-
tion of the criteria required for formation of a clique topology between nodes
that are directly connected to the internet, and further develop this analysis to
present the necessary criteria which lead to formation of hierarchical and star
topologies between internet-connected nodes and the rest of the network.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 details the
model of IoT networks, followed by the formulation of network formation game
in Section 3. Emergence of stable IoT topologies and their criteria is discussed
in Section 4, and the results of a numerical simulation is presented in 5. Finally,
Section 6 concludes the paper with remarks on future areas of work.
2 IoT Network Model
The generic definition of IoT has given rise to numerous models for the network
structure and architecture [5]. In this work, IoT is considered to be a network
formed with the objective of enabling direct or relayed connectivity of hetero-
geneous nodes to the internet (or other backbone networks). Heterogeneity of
nodes entails diverse hardware and software parameters throughout the network,
such as the number and type of communication interfaces (e.g. WLAN, LTE,
Ethernet, etc.), energy constraints, and bandwidth requirements.
Accordingly, we model the IoT as a network G(P ) of N nodes P = {Pi |∀i ∈
{1, 2, ..., N}}, each with an arbitrary number of single channel radio interfaces.
This definition may be seamlessly extended to cover multi-channel radios as well,
via representing each as a group of single-channel radios. It is assumed that all
interfaces of a node can be active simultaneously, but as detailed in Section 3,
the effects of activating each additional interface on undesired aspects such as
co- and cross-interference, channel congestion, and energy consumption may be
suitably captured in the system cost function. The presented model also allows
that some, or all of the interfaces in nodes may remain idle throughout the
analyzed operation.
As the focus of this study is on topological properties, it is assumed that
nodes are static relative to each other. Also, we consider the case that every
node in the network is aware of its distance in terms of number of intermediate
hops with every other node in the network. This can be justified by reliance on
routing tables obtained from proactive network layer protocols such as OLSR
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[14]. The extent of a node’s knowledge of the overall network topology is assumed
to be limited to its directly connected neighbors.
Nodes are classified in two categories: Those with direct connectivity to the
internet, such as WiFi Access Points and 3G/LTE Enabled Devices, and those
which need to be connected to the internet via the nodes in the former group,
such as Bluetooth/Zigbee sensors. Let the set of Internet Connected (IC) nodes
GI ∈ P denote the set of nodes with direct connection to the internet, and
the set of non-ICs GS ∈ P\GI is the set of nodes that do not have a direct
connection to the internet. The emerging network is thus hierarchical with at
least two tiers: a higher tier formed by IC nodes, and a lower tier comprised
of non-IC nodes who aim to connect to the higher tier. Hence, an important
objective of IoT network controllers, whether centralized or distributed, is to
enable the connection to the internet to the non-IC node, via linking them to
one or more IC nodes. In line with practical network protocols, a further limit is
imposed to the maximum number of hops that may exist between each pair of
nodes, denoted by hMax. The following section provides the details of one such
controller based on a game theoretical framework known as Network Formation
Games.
3 Game Formulation
Formation of macro-scale topologies in distributed networks is the collective re-
sult of the individual decisions made by each nodes on which set of nodes to
connect with, and which links to severe. With the assumption that every such
node aims at gaining more utility from its decisions and consequent actions, this
interaction of multiple decision makers can be formulated as a Network Forma-
tion Game [13]. Such games are comprised of competing agents who control the
set of nodes they are connected to, with the common objective of forming coali-
tions of nodes that is most profitable for the deciding agent. It is evident that
the game being considered in this work is of the non-cooperative type, since the
decisions are made independently. Another assumption adopted in our proposal
is that a link between two nodes is established if, and only if, both nodes con-
sent to its establishment. This assumption emulates the real-world phenomenon
that occurs in cost-optimizing distributed networks. A simple, yet realistic ex-
ample is depicted in figure (2. This figure illustrates a network formation game
in which the objective of all players is to minimize their cost while maintaining
their reachability from any other player by at most one intermediate hop - a
property that we shall label as one-hop-reachable. The cost incurred to each
player of this game is the cost of establishing their immediate links (denoted by
edge weights in figure (2), which is assumed to be the same for both of the linked
nodes. If two nodes are not one-hop-reachable, their cost is set to be infinity. For
instance, the cost incurred to node B is the cost of establishing the link BC plus
the cost of establishing BD, i.e. 2 + 4 = 6. As is shown in the figure, for node
C to be one-hop-reachable to node A, the minimum cost is obtained by relaying
through node D. Yet for node D, establishment of a link to node C does not
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Fig. 2: Example of the mutual consent in Myerson games
bring any utility but losses, as node D has already established a cheaper path
to C via node B, and is directly connected to node A. Hence, node D will not
consent to spending its limited bandwidth and energy to relay a transmission
that gains him no benefits. Consequently, nodes A and C settle on establishing
an expensive direct link to avoid the infinite cost of unreachability.
Network formation games that are based on consensual establishment of links
are known as bilateral linking or Myerson games [15], which is a widely adopted
model in game theoretic distributed topology control, mainly due to its agree-
ment with the opportunistic behavior of agents in decentralized networks. Our
proposed framework builds atop of the previous work on bilateral link formation
by extending the application of the Myerson model to considerations beyond that
of minimizing energy consumption as the sole objective of the game, replacing
the abstracted link establishment parameters with those of real wireless inter-
face characteristics and propagation model, and filling the gap in self-organizing
IoTs by providing a novel cross-layer framework for analytical design and eval-
uation of protocols and parameters involved in the distributed formation of IoT
topologies.
Even though the real phenomenon of network formation in ad hoc communi-
cations networks is of a dynamic nature, this work concentrates on the analysis
of a static bilateral linking game, with the aim of gaining insights on the charac-
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teristics of emerging stable topologies, along with the criteria that leads to their
emergence. Similar to every other game, our proposed Myerson game is formed
of players, set of strategies, and a payoff/cost structure, the details of each are
presented in this section.
3.1 Players
Let P = {p1, p2, ...pN} denote a group ofN agents. Each agent pi is characterized
by the following features:
– Ordered set of its radio interfaces Ri, where |Ri| is the number of interfaces
and Ri(r ∈ {1, 2, ..., |Ri|}) ∈ {0, 1} is a binary value, indicating whether the
interface is currently being used or not.
– Frequency of operation for each radio interface fi,r
– Maximum bandwidth for each radio interface bi,r
– Minimum required bandwidth bMaxi
– Maximum transmit power for each radio interface τi,r
– Receiver sensitivity for each radio interface §i,r
– Maximum antenna gain for each radio interface xi,r
– 2-D Position γi = (xi, yi)
– Feature tuple for each interface wi,r = (fi,r, bi,r, b
Max
i , τi,r, Si,r, xi,r, γi)
Define the network topology G = {gij : i, k ∈ P, i 6= j}. If a bidirectional
link is established between pi and pj , then gij = (ri, rj), where ri ∈ Ri is the
interface chosen by the node i to communicate with the corresponding interface
in node j, i.e. rj ∈ Rj . If there is no direct link between i and j, gij = (−1,−1).
3.2 Strategies
Let Ci denote the cost function for every node pi. Any node pi ∈ P may form
a link gij = (ri, rj) with any Node pj in the neighborhood M(i), defined as the
set of all nodes that fall within the maximum communications range of i, if:
1. Nodes must have at least one type of radio interface available and in common,
i.e. :
2. ∆C(pi, G+ (ri, rj)) < 0
3. ∆C(pj , G+ (ri, rj)) < 0
Where∆C(pK , G+(rk, rl)) = C(pk, G∪{(rk, rl)})−C(pk, G) is the difference
between the total cost to node pk by establishing the link (rk, rl) and the total
cost to pk without the establishment of this link.
Agent pi may remove a link with agent pj in M
′ ⊂ Rck{Ri(k) 6= (−1,−1)} if:
∆C(pi, G− (ri, rj)) < 0
Where ∆C(pk, G− (rk, rl)) = C(pk, G\{(rk, rl)})−C(pk, G) is the difference
between the cost incurred by node pk removing the link (rk, rl) and the cost
incurred by maintaining this link.
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3.3 Payoff Structure
For each node pi, the payoff of forming a direct link is dependent on the set of
objectives listed below:
1. Minimize the total cost of link establishment
∑deg(pi)
z=1 L
′
i(z)
2. Minimize the hop distance to all nodes in the network, with priority over
minimizing distance to the nodes directly connected to the internet.
3. Minimize energy consumption by avoiding excessive relay transmissions
The corresponding cost function for each node is thus formulated as:
C(i, G) = Ci =
deg(pi)∑
z=1
L′i(z) + Γ
∑
j∈GI
h(i, j)
+
∑
k∈GS
h(i, k) +Bi (1)
Where L′i(z) is the cost of establishing the z-th link of pi, with deg(pi) denot-
ing the number of links established by pi. Let Li(z) be the link between nodes i
and z. To model the link cost, the following factors are considered:
– Li(z) is directly proportional to the minimum transmission power required
for z to receive the signal. The transmission power depends on the fading
model and noise on the channel, which generally is inversely proportional to
the Euclidean distance between nodes, their antenna gains, and the receiver
sensitivity. Every interface has a maximum budgeted transmit power , beyond
which Li(z) =∞
– L − i(z) is directly proportional to the number of connections established on
interface Ri(r). The more this number is, the more congestion is expected and
hence the throughput suffers.
– Li(z) is inversely proportional to bandwidth. Higher the bandwidth, higher
the throughput will be.
Hence, a generic formulation for Li(z) is constructed as:
deg(pi)∑
z=1
L′i(z) =
|Ri|∑
r=1
Ri(r)
∑
z∈Ps.t.giz=(Ri(r),o)
α.ρi.
σir
βir
(2)
Where α is a constant factoring the effect of each additional link on interface
Ri(r), ρi is the relative importance of preserving energy to achieving the desired
throughput, σir is the power transmitted by pi on this link, and βir is the ratio
of the available bandwidth to the required bandwidth, i.e.:
βir =
bir
bMini
(3)
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The factor Γ ≥ 1 is the weighting factor for tuning the emphasize on minimiz-
ing the shortest hop-distance h(i, j) to every IC node j ∈ GI . Bi is the bridging
coefficient of node pi, estimating the local burden of bridging communities and
thus modeling the relative amount of relay transmissions that pi may have to
handle for its neighbors. It is shown in [16] and [17] that the higher values of
bridging coefficient represent a higher risk of congestion, as well as collisions.
Bridging coefficient is calculated as:
Bi =
1
deg(i∑
j∈{k:gik 6=(−1,−1)}
1
deg(j)
(4)
4 Equilibrium Topologies in Static game
This section investigates the criteria which enable the emergence of stable and
efficient topologies from the proposed network formation mechanism. Having a
game theoretic abstraction of the problem, we study the characteristics of stable
networks by analyzing the equilibria of our model. One of the most intuitive types
of equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium, defined as strategy profiles at which no
player can increase its profit by unilaterally deviating from that profile, hinting
at a stable outcome. Yet, Nash equilibrium is shown to be a weak notion for
stability in network formation games [18]. Considering the bilateral nature of link
formation in such games, stability of outcomes is characterized more accurately
by considering bilateral deviations. To satisfy this requirement, we consider the
notion of pairwise stability [18]. A strategy profile is said to be pairwise stable
if no unilateral or bilateral deviations could increase the utility of the players.
Formally, a topology G is pairwise stable if the following conditions are met:
1. ∀i, ij ∈ G,C(i, G) ≤ C(i, G− ij)
2. ∀i, j /∈ G, ifC(i, G+ ij) < C(i, G)thenC(j,G+ ij) > C(j,G)
In the following subsections, we utilize pairwise stability in the formal analysis
of stable topologies that can emerge from the proposed model.
4.1 Formation of Cliques
A notable number of recent literature on bilateral link formation games are based
on models that result in systematical limitation of pairwise stability to forest and
tree topologies (e.g.[19], [20]) This property greatly neuters the applicability of
such models to IoT. As discussed in Section 2, nodes in IoT are categorized as
either Internet-Connected (IC) or non-IC. It is intuitive to assume that each
IC node is directly connected to every other IC nodes through the internet
connection, thereby the set of all IC nodes inherently forms a clique. Therefore,
if the cost of link establishment is bounded by a critical value, it is expected that
the clique remains stable. In the following theorem, we prove that under certain
criteria, this topology is indeed pairwise stable.
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Theorem 1 Let Li(k) be the maximum cost for any internet-connected node
pi ∈ GI to establish a link with node pk ∈ GI . If Li(k) < Γ − 1, then the nodes
in GI form a clique.
Proof. Assume a node pi that is yet to establish connections to any node in G.
For any node pk ∈ GI , the cost difference of establishing a link is given by:
C(pi, G+ gik) = C(pi, G ∪ {ri, rk)})− C(pk, G)
= Li(k) + Γ (−1) + 0 +∆Bi (5)
Where
∆Bi =
1
deg(i)+1∑
j∈{∀ζ|giζ 6=(−1,1)}
1
deg(j) + 1
−
1
deg(i)∑
j∈{∀ζ|giζ 6=(−1,1)}
1
deg(j)
(6)
Considering the minimum and maximum values of deg(i) and
∑
j∈{∀ζ|giζ 6=(−1,1)}
1
deg(j)},
it is trivial to show that:
0 < ∆Bi < 1
Hence, the maximum valid value of the cost difference is given by:
∆C(pi, G+ gik) = Li(k)− Γ + 1 (7)
For this cost difference to be feasible for all nodes in GI , the following con-
dition must be satisfied:
∆C(pi, G+ gik) < 0
⇒ Li(k)− Γ + 1 < 0
⇒ Li(k) < Γ − 1 (8)
If this condition holds true, establishment of a link between any pair of nodes
in GI decreases the cost for both nodes, hence leading to a clique topology.
Inversely, severing any link in the resulting clique by any node i ∈ GI would
impose a higher cost to i than gain. Therefore, this criteria leads to cliques that
are pairwise-stable.
4.2 Formation of Stars and Hierarchies
Having established the criteria for the proposed model to result in a realistic
stable topology for IC nodes, we study the topologies that emerge under this
criteria for non-IC nodes. First, we derive the conditions that result in every
non-IC node being linked to at most one of the IC nodes. Then, we derive the
necessary conditions for formation of star clusters between non-IC nodes and IC
nodes.
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Theorem 2 If Li(k) < Γ−1, the maximum number of links between any non-IC
node j ∈ GS and the set of Internet-connected nodes GI is 1.
Proof. Assuming there already exists a link between i ∈ GI and j ∈ GS , the
maximum cost difference of establishing a second link from another node i′ ∈
GI\{i} to j is:
∆C(i′, G+ gi′j) = Li′(j)− Γ + 0 + 1 (9)
For this link to be feasible for i′, the following condition must be met:
∆C(i′, G+ gi′j) < 0
⇒ Li′(j) < Γ − 1 (10)
Therefore, if the minimum cost of connection to a node j ∈ GS satisfies
Li′(j) > Γ − 1, every non-IC node is connected to at most one IC node.
In the following theorem, we derive the conditions under which every non-
IC node is directly connected to an IC node, thus forming star-shaped clusters
whose centers are IC nodes.
Theorem 3 Let Li(k) < Γ − 1 and Li′(j) > Γ − 1, the maximum degree of any
non-IC node j ∈ GS is 1 iff ∀j
′ ∈ GS \ j, Lj(j
′) > 12 .
Proof. Theorem 2 proves that under the aforementioned conditions, the maxi-
mum number of links between any non-IC node and all IC nodes is 1. Assume
that j establishes is a second link to a node j′ ∈ GS . The cost difference is given
by:
∆C(j,G+ gjj′ ) = Lj(j
′) + 0− 1 +
1
2
(11)
For this action to be infeasible, the cost difference must be positive. Therefore:
Lj(j
′) + 0− 1 +
1
2
> 0
⇒ Lj(j
′) >
1
2
(12)
As a corollary of Theorem 3, it is worth noting that if G is connected and
the conditions of theorems 1 and 2 are satisfied, but condition of theorem 3 is
not, then the resulting topology contains nodes that have one link to the IC set,
but are connected to one or more non-IC nodes. Such nodes act as gateways and
relays for other non-IC nodes connected to them, and the emerging topologies
have more than the original 2 levels of hierarchy, namely IC and non-IC. Conse-
quently, this model allows for resource planning by determination of nodes that
are bound to become relays, and therefore require higher communications and
processing capabilities.
Game-Theoretic Model of Self-Organization in IoT 11
5 Numerical Results
To demonstrate the performance of our proposed model in IoT, a smart home
network of 10 nodes is simulated. The network is comprised of 4 IC nodes con-
nected to the internet through WLAN 802.11n, and equipped with Bluetooth
and Z-Wave [21] interfaces, 3 non-IC nodes with Bluetooth and Z-Wave inter-
faces, and 3 non-IC nodes with only Z-Wave interfaces. Nodes are positioned on
a 30m × 30m grid, as depicted in figure 3a. Parameters of each radio interface
are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Symbol Value
Freq. of WLAN fi,0 2.4GHz
Freq. of Bluetooth fi,1 2.4GHz
Freq. of Z-Wave fi,2 0.908GHz
Max. Bitrate of WLAN bi,0 300Mbps
Max. Bitrate of Bluetooth bi,1 2Mbps
Max. Bitrate of Z-Wave bi,2 40Kbps
Min Req. Bitrate of IC Nodes bMini 10Mbps
Min Req. Bitrate of Bluetooth Nodes bMini 0.5Mbps
Min Req. Bitrate of Z-Wave Nodes bMini 5Kbps
Max. Tx Power of WLAN τi,0 1W
Max. Tx Power of Bluetooth τi,1 25mW
Max. Tx Power of Z-Wave τi,2 1mW
Rx Sensitivity of WLAN §i,0 10
−11W
Rx Sensitivity of Bluetooth §i,1 10
−10W
Rx Sensitivity of Z-Wave §i,0 6.3× 10
−13W
Max. Hop Distance hMax 5
Considering the highest link cost, the condition for formation of Cliques
presented in Theorem 1 is satisfied by setting Γ = 570. As depicted in Figure X,
the resulting topology is a clique for the IC nodes, while non-IC nodes represent
a hierarchical structure. Also, it is observed that the non-IC nodes 7 and 9 are
connected to more than one IC node. By increasing the value of Γ to 600, the
model results in a topology that satisfies the conditions of both theorems 1 and
2, where nodes 6 and 7 act as relays for nodes 8 and 9, respectively.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a model for self-organization in IoT based on bilat-
eral link formation strategies. The model captures the heterogeneity of devices
in IoT, as well as the emphasis on connectivity to the internet in the proposed
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Fig. 3: (a)Formation of Clique between IC Nodes, (b)Formation of Hierarchy
between Non-IC Nodes
cost function. The subsequent analysis of the static game established the cri-
teria for emergence of cliques between the set of internet-connected nodes, as
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well as multi-hop and star structures. Following the proposed model, further
analysis of the static game may provide insights into the efficiency of emerging
topologies, and establish the criteria for derivation of optimal network structures.
Furthermore, this model provides a foundation for design and evaluation of dy-
namic games and algorithms for distributed self-organization in heterogeneous
networks such as IoT.
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